Conflicting Reward Systems and Their Impact on Criminal Justice Research Paper

Conflicting Reward Systems and Their Impact on Criminal Justice Administration - Research Paper ExampleKerr (1975) presents a wide-reaching warning about the force of fix systems that do not understand the knowledge or motivations of the individuals (or the society) the reward system hopes to incentivize toward whatever personal credit line of action. In order to draw attention to the scope of this problem, the author utilizes samples from politics, organizations, and profit-making firms, even though his intended reference is only concerned with the latter. By using examples from politics, however, the authors analysis opens up avenues of investigation associate to public administration, particularly miserable justice administration and the incentives it hopes to provide for mending the behaviors of convicted persons. Given the importance of preventing criminal recidivism and the economic impacts of fewer people in jails, it is no surprise that public administration officials would be raise in ways to realign their reward systems toward the knowledge or motivations of individuals. With those considerations in mind, this paper hopes to survey some of the problems that occur when reward systems in criminal justice work against the needs and wants of administrators, and how administrators can prevent that from happening. Employees argon very good at figuring out what gets rewarded in the workplace and doing those things instead of what they are officially told to do. Employee ambivalence occurs when the explicit norms or desires of an organization come into conflict with the content of the reward systems and the norms generated by that system. An example of such a conflict might be when a company encourages employees to follow the rules, but excessively to be effective in their jobgetting their responsibilities d ace any way they can. So, despite the inclination for ethical behavior from upper management, cutthroat behavior might be ultimately what get s rewarded (Spencer & Sims, 1995, p. 190). And once a single individual figures out how to get rewarded, the pressure falls on his colleagues or else fall behind. precisely a single violation from a single individual can expose a deep, implicit in(p) problem within a reward system. A specific application of Kerr (1975)s analysis of involved reward systems is contained within a study of prosecutorial misconduct. Bibas (2009) discusses possible ways to regulate the conduct of prosecutors, who the author believes perk up the most unreviewable power or discretion of any public official. Embedded in this analysis is a response to potential reward systems for prosecutors based on financial gains. For example, one perspective offers the solution of recognize prosecutors whose initial charges closely match the charges the criminal was convicted upon. However, keeping in mind Kerr (1975)s warning that what one measures is what one gets, sizable monetary rewards for particular statistics could lead prosecutors to undercharge rather than overcharge and to plea engagement to avoid losing rewards for ethical misconduct (Bibas, 2009, p. 156). Thus, the opposite problem arises out of the solution for the original problem, which is particularly pregnant to bear in mind when creating reward systems for individuals within the criminal justice system. Manipulable and inflatable quantitative statistics often define the effectiveness of prosecutors, which poses a problem for effective reward systems based on performance. Also, reward systems that become overused tend to produce the opposite effect of rewarding the right behaviors. In other words, the to a greater extent rewards